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THE “THREAT OF TERRORISM” AND THE 
RIGHT TO THE CITY 
Peter Marcuse 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
Security in the face of a declared threat of terrorism dominates much of 
the discussion about city life in the United States today, with frequent 
reference to the events of September 11, 2001 (“September 11” or “9/11”).  
Do cities give appropriate weight to the threat of terrorism after 9/11?  Is 
the terrorist threat in fact a product of 9/11?  How have cities and urban 
planning changed post-9/11, and how is terrorism related to those changes? 
The basic argument of this paper is that whatever has changed about the 
actual threat of terrorism since 9/11, a great deal has changed in that which 
is done in its name.  I argue that there have been both legitimate and false 
responses to the perceived threat.  The impact of the legitimate response is 
almost trivial, representing more of a continuation of trends already in 
place before 9/11 rather than something new.  In contrast, the impact of the 
false response has been substantial.  The false response has used the threat 
of terrorism as a pretext to pursue an agenda that has nothing to do with 
physical safety or protection against terrorism, but is directed instead at 
winning elections, restricting debate and dissent, and maintaining tight 
political control over the range of democratic processes.1
 
 1. The sharpest statement of this position that I have found is in a film shown at the 
2005 Cannes film festival: “The Power of Nightmares” by filmmaker and senior BBC 
producer Adam Curtis.  According to one reviewer, “[i]n his film, Curtis argues that Bush 
and Blair have used what he says is the largely illusory fear of terror and hidden webs of 
organized evil following the September 11, 2001, attacks to reinforce their authority and 
rally their nations.”  Erik Kirschbaum, UK Film at Cannes Says Terror Fears Exaggerated, 
REUTERS, May 14, 2005. 
  In New York 
City, many such agendas have related to changes in real estate values in 
lower Manhattan.  In general, however, the implicit agenda has been to 
increase the political control of dissent, to limit debate about the general 
direction of certain policies, and to control the use of public space for 
democratic but dissident purposes.  That implicit agenda has been advanced 
since 9/11 under the pretext of the threat of terrorism, not in legitimate 
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response to it.  I do not, however, claim that these limitations on the use of 
public space, and the neo-conservative program with which these 
limitations are connected are new or solely related to 9/11; again, the 
pattern precedes 9/11, although it has since intensified.2
Let me begin by specifying what I mean by legitimate and false 
responses to terrorism: 
 
 
 2. For an overview of the origins of neo-conservatism, see IRVING KRISTOL, 
NEOCONSERVATISM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEA (1999).  For a critical view, see 
STEPHEN ERIC BRONNER, Constructing Neo-Conservatism , LOGOS, Spring 2004, at 7, 
available at http://www.logosjournal.com/issue_3.2/bronner.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 
2005). 
MARCUSE_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:05 PM 
2005 THREAT OF TERRORISM 103 
 
 
Targeted responses are effective responses intended to eliminate 
grounded threats of terrorism.  The goal of targeted responses is to 
 TYPE OF RESPONSE DEFINITION EXAMPLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legitimate 
 
Targeted responses  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Balanced responses 
Directed at grounded risks, 
regardless of costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attempting to balance risks 
against economic and civil 
rights costs 
Efficient: 
metal 
detectors at 
airports 
Inefficient: 
shoe 
removal at 
airports 
 
Surveillance 
cameras at 
entries to 
public 
buildings; 
inefficient 
targeted 
responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
False 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spillover responses 
 
 
 
Induced responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pretext responses 
Expanding the meaning of 
“security”  
 
 
Building a climate justifying 
unrelated responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Directly justifying unrelated 
responses 
No Loitering 
signs at train 
stations 
 
Ethnic 
profiling, 
immigrant 
restrictions, 
election 
rhetoric, 
“security” 
measures 
unrelated to 
safety 
 
Constrained 
assemblies, 
Iraq 
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eliminate essentially all risk from the targeted threat.  Targeted responses 
share two characteristics: they are based substantially on the belief that the 
risks at which they are directed are real, and the measures aimed at 
guarding against those risks use the minimum resources and cause the 
minimum disruption needed to achieve their objectives.  Metal detectors at 
airports would seem to fall into this category; other airport security 
measures (such as taking off one’s shoes or having dogs sniff passengers or 
luggage), may be ineffective or inefficient.  At the margin, some balancing 
of costs and benefits is also involved; a very complex security measure that 
reduces risk only to a trivial extent may not be appropriate.  But the 
decision as to what measures are appropriate is, at least in the first instance, 
a technical one, in which the capabilities of various technologies and the 
evaluation of intelligence information are key.  I claim no expertise on this 
decision, even though some of the measures in effect today seem to me to 
defy common sense. 
Balanced responses take into account the absolute costs of eliminating 
grounded threats, and attempt to strike a balance between physical safety 
and economic or social cost.  The harm that could be done at a crowded 
subway station in New York City, for instance, might be great, but the 
disruption caused by any serious measure to avoid the risk of that harm 
would be tremendous.  As a result, essentially no action is taken.  For 
example, posting signs that say, “If You See Something, Say Something” 
in train stations is not likely to eliminate much risk.  The importance of 
large numbers of people getting to work without a huge waste of time 
outbalances the protection that any further measures might provide against 
the risks involved. 
Beyond these two types of legitimate responses, other measures justified 
under the banner of responses to terrorism in fact are not reasonably related 
to such threats.  These false responses might be separated into three 
different, but interrelated, categories.  Spillover responses are measures that 
have nothing to do with terrorism; rather, they simply extend anti-terror 
control functions into areas unrelated to terrorism.  These responses 
include: no loitering signs in public spaces that are actually aimed at 
drunkenness or petty crime; metal detectors in school buildings; and 
security measures in office buildings that are not plausible targets of 
terrorist activity.  Induced responses contribute to a vicious circle in which 
insecurity is first heightened by measures adopted in the name of security, 
and then the insecurity is addressed by measures that simply reduce the 
insecurity that those very measures created.  Proclaiming an orange alert, 
and then posting armed National Guard personnel conspicuously on 
random trains, is an example.  The alert induces insecurity, that the sight of 
the guard is intended to assuage. 
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Finally, pretext responses are the most pernicious of the false responses 
to the threat of terrorism, for they are unconnected with the threat.  Instead, 
they are simply used to impose restrictions on conduct that is otherwise an 
essential component of democracy.  The classic examples are restrictions 
on public assemblies, demonstrations, parades, and mass meetings.  
Although persons enacting these restrictions claim they are justified as 
antiterrorism measures, these restrictions in fact implement the Bush 
administration’s  desire to restrict protest and maintain control. 
Private and public responses to the threat of terrorism range from 
legitimate to false.  The line between them is not always clear, except in 
extreme cases.  The stereotyping of what a terrorist looks like, with all its 
racial and religious overtones, is clearly a false response, as is stockpiling 
duct tape as a defense against biological terrorism.3
There are, however, changes in cities that can be traced back to 
legitimate responses.  This paper goes on to consider these changes below, 
and tries to separate out legitimate from false responses. 
  And it appears that 
individuals in suburban communities are more likely than their urban 
counterparts to alter their habits in response to the threat of terrorism, to be 
suspicious of strangers, to post police in public spaces and at public events, 
and to guard their public buildings even though the threat is presumably 
greater in dense urban centers. 
For important urban buildings and locations that may seriously be 
considered targets for attack, some controls on entry may be rational, but 
controls on entry were a common feature of pre-9/11 life, as evidenced by 
gated communities, card entry limits on private office buildings, and metal 
detectors in criminal courts.  Increases in surveillance measures might be 
inherent to the heightened awareness of risks after 9/11.  Yet there has been 
no apparent lessening of the value accruing to height, and skyscrapers are 
continuing to be built in cities seeking global status around the world.  The 
limitations on height are more a function of the economics of construction 
and occupancy4 than of fear of attack.5
 
 3. I would go further and argue that the election of George W. Bush was in large part a 
result of a false response to the threat of terrorism, but that brings us outside the scope of 
this article. 
  The economics may indeed have 
shifted slightly, due to concerns about structural strength and emergency 
exit arrangements, but that impact seems to be marginal.  Some additional 
 4. CAROL WILLIS, FORM FOLLOWS FINANCE 45-46 (1995).  According to Willis, the 
principle of “economic height” refers to “the number of stories that would produce the 
highest rate on the money invested.”  Id. 
 5. The vacancy rate for buildings over fifty stories in Manhattan is only slightly higher 
than that for all office buildings today.  See Alan Krueger, The Commercial Resilience of 
New York is Clear Three Years After the 9/11 Attacks, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 16, 2004, at C2. 
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security measures might certainly be expected, and they may provide some 
marginally greater protection; others are wildly exaggerated, for reasons 
discussed below. Certainly the mass exodus from cities or city centers that 
some had expected after 9/11 did not take place.6
The sea change in the patterns of development that many expected after 
9/11 did not occur.  I concentrate on four areas in which significant change 
in cities is in fact taking place: first, the location of public investment 
within the city (this is unique to New York City but a direct consequence of 
9/11); second, sprawl, flight from the city center, and decentralization of 
central business districts; third, changing patterns of polarization and 
inequality in cities; and fourth, changes in the nature and use of public 
space.  This essay attempts to disentangle the causes and consequences of 
each of these four areas, focusing on how these responses relate to the 
threat of terrorism.  This essay concludes with a comment on how all these 
changes affect what Henri Lefebvre, the noted French Marxist intellectual, 
called the “Right to the City.”
 
7
Lefebvre makes a useful distinction between lived space and empirical 
space, between space as it is perceived and used by people and the external 
“objective” space as it is described by maps and planners and laws.  The 
changes that have followed 9/11 are changes in lived space in the Lefebvre 
sense—that is, changes in the way space is used, by whom, and the way it 
affects the lives of people who either use or want to use it. 
 
 
 6. For a discussion written shortly after 9/11 predicting an exodus from New York 
City, see Peter Marcuse, Urban Form and Globalization after September 11: The View from 
New York, 26 INT’L J. OF URB. & REGIONAL RES. 596 (2002). 
 7. HENRI LEFEBVRE, WRITINGS ON CITIES Part II (Eleonore Kofman & Elizabeth Lebas, 
eds. & trans., 1996). 
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II. THE ACTUAL PATTERNS OF URBAN CHANGE TODAY 
A. Lower Manhattan vs. Midtown8
In New York City, there have been, at least since the nineteenth century, 
two central business districts: one in midtown, the other in lower 
Manhattan.
 
9  From a real estate point of view, these two business districts 
have been in competition with each other, with lower Manhattan as the 
loser for the last 50 years. This is the reason the World Trade Center was 
built in the first place: the Rockefeller investment in the Chase Manhattan 
Bank building in lower Manhattan needed the public push that the giant 
project was expected to provide to justify it as a real estate venture.10
September 11, one would think, would change the relative position of 
lower Manhattan and midtown. Over 12,000,000 square feet of office space 
were destroyed or rendered unusable on that day.  One might expect lower 
Manhattan to become less attractive to investors and potential tenants as a 
result of the attack, but one also might expect that the demand for the 
remaining space, so much being lost, would increase, if not immediately 
then at least in the middle run.  Those that had found lower Manhattan to 
be an attractive location before 9/11 would presumably still find it 
attractive afterwards, the damage from 9/11 having been overcome.  This 
increase in demand, however, has not materialized.  Because of the 
  But 
lower Manhattan consistently lagged behind midtown Manhattan despite 
the Rockefeller initiatives, and after 9/11 even Chase moved many of its 
activities from downtown to its midtown locations.  While the World Trade 
Center’s presence ultimately gave lower Manhattan a boost, it was not 
sufficient to overcome the locational, social, and agglomeration advantages 
of midtown. 
 
 8. For a general description of the events in New York City discussed below, see M. 
Christine Boyer, Mediations on a Wounded Skyline and its Strategraphies, in  AFTER THE 
WORLD TRADE CENTER: RETHINKING NEW YORK CITY 109-20 (Michael Sorkin & Sharon 
Zukin eds., 2002).  For details on more current events not otherwise footnoted below, there 
are several websites that provide both historical and current information.  For example, the 
Civic Alliance website, available at http://www.civic-alliance.org, is maintained by New 
York City civic organizations and planning professionals who have volunteered their time to 
stay abreast of developments affecting lower Manhattan after 9/11.  The Municipal Art 
Society is a non-profit organization that focuses on New York City’s urban design and 
planning, as is the Regional Planning Association, available at www.rpa.org.  The Gotham 
Gazette, published by the New York Citizens Union, is another comprehensive source for 
most of the issues discussed herein, and is available at www.gothamgazette.com 
 9. E.g., Marcuse, supra note 6, at 598. 
 10. See ROBERT FITCH, THE ASSASSINATION OF NEW YORK 51 (1993).  The initial plan 
for the World Trade Center called for it to be located next to Chase Manhattan Bank.  Id. 
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political necessity of showing that the attack on the World Trade Center 
was not a fatal blow to the city and state and country, and that terrorism 
would not have a lasting effect, billions of dollars were poured into a 
rebuilding process in lower Manhattan.  Substantial subsidies, outright 
grants, and low-interest-rate and tax-free loans from special Liberty Bond 
issues were made available to businesses that either remained in or moved 
to lower Manhattan, and even to those willing to commit to staying there.  
Still, despite these subsidies, the vacancy rate in lower Manhattan is 16.8 
percent, compared to 11.3 percent in midtown.11
But the political interests of Mayor Bloomberg and Governor Pataki, 
coupled with pressure from investors in lower Manhattan real estate, have 
required continuing public investment in lower Manhattan.  The 
countervailing pressures from investors in midtown real estate and the 
continuing attractiveness of midtown are substantial; thus, Bank of 
America, which was built in midtown, obtained Liberty Bond financing 
despite its location.  But one crucial decision went the other way: the 
terminus of a direct rail link to JFK airport.  The transportation 
infrastructure is in fact denser in midtown and both the available linkages 
and the number of directly accessible locations of interest to air travelers 
are greater in midtown.  Despite this, public investment will go to a vastly 
expensive transportation hub in lower Manhattan.  Considerations of 
efficiency would have dictated otherwise, especially after the physical 
impact of 9/11 shifted occupancy from lower Manhattan to midtown.  The 
political use of 9/11, not the event itself, led to this result. 
 
B. Movement away from the city, decentralization. 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, a number of major firms moved out 
of lower Manhattan—and not just businesses that were directly affected by 
the World Trade Center destruction.  Other businesses that had previously 
preferred lower Manhattan expanded or built up secondary or redundant 
centers.12
 
 11. See, e.g., MANHATTAN OFFICE SPACE, at http://www.manhattanofficespace.com (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2005). 
  And many people expected other cities throughout the country, 
and even throughout the world, to follow this pattern.  Because of the 
supposed vulnerability of centrally-located operations, many functions 
were expected to be set up away from city centers, either in locations 
elsewhere in the metropolitan region or far away from older centers.  
TIAA-CREF, for instance, the biggest pension fund in the United States, 
 12. Marcuse, supra note 6, at 597-98. 
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moved its offices to Charlotte, Virginia.13
That pattern of movement away from city centers did occur.  I call this 
pattern “concentrated decentralization.”
 
14  This pattern of concentrated 
decentralization is generally recognized as long-standing.15  Its residential 
manifestation is suburban sprawl.  Its spatial manifestation is in edge cities 
and the growth of business clusters outside central cities but still within 
metropolitan regions—for example, White Plains, Princeton, and Stamford 
in the New York City region.16  Its real estate manifestation is a sharp 
decline in property values in downtown areas in all but the largest and 
strongest cities.  Its political manifestation is in policies of smart growth 
and in the economic revitalization of downtown areas through tax 
concessions, public loans and grants, limitations on sprawl, and the flexible 
application of land use controls.  An induced threat of terrorism has caused 
some wildly unbalanced responses in the process of decentralization.  For 
example, after the South Central Connecticut Regional Water Authority 
hired an architect to design its new water filtration plant in the outskirts of 
New Haven, the Authority tried to keep the location a secret out of concern 
that it would attract terrorists.17
But these are mostly patterns of long duration.  The redevelopment and 
urban renewal programs of the 1950s and 1960s represent early examples 
of patterns of concentrated decentralization.  These programs reflected a 
shift in economic activity from manufacturing to services, which changed 
the economic basis on which many downtowns had been built. They have 
to do with an increase in the centralization of control, enabled (but not 
caused) by technological advances that permitted an efficient increase in 
the span of control, and a process of globalization that permitted greater 
and greater accumulations of capital.
 
18
 
 13. See id. at 599. 
  They have to do with the spatial 
patterns produced by that centralization of control, both within and among 
cities, so that a few downtowns grew rapidly while others declined 
abruptly.  They have to do with the decentralization that communications 
and advanced transportation technologies made both possible and desirable.  
They have to do with real estate markets and labor markets that reflect 
these developments.  September 11 focused attention on them, and in New 
 14. Id. at 596. 
 15. See id. at 599. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Fred A. Bernstein, In My Backyard, Please: The Infrastructure Beautiful Movement, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at 37. 
 18. For a fuller discussion of the impact of globalization on city form, see Peter Marcuse 
& Ronald van Kempen, Introduction to GLOBALIZING CITIES: A NEW SPATIAL ORDER? 1, 1 
(Peter Marcuse & Ronald van Kempen eds., 1999). 
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York City physical destruction accentuated their effect.  But the vacancy 
rates in lower Manhattan were high well before 9/11, and vacancy rates are 
still high in the many buildings in lower Manhattan that were not 
physically damaged.19
For businesses, and increasingly for residences, the pattern of 
decentralization is not one of shapeless sprawl.  Agglomeration economies, 
the benefits of being near other activities in the same business sector, 
remain important and lead to the substantial clustering of business activities 
both inside and outside the central city of metropolitan areas.  The 
availability of support service businesses (such as accounting, law, or 
financial firms) that are only profitable if there is sufficient market for them 
reinforces this pattern of concentrated decentralization.  On the residential 
side, public facilities with cultural, entertainment, and environmental 
amenities that can only be provided where there is sufficient demand 
reinforces this pattern.  Thus, the pattern is appropriately called 
“concentrated” decentralization.
 
20
This pattern of concentrated decentralization has many undesirable 
consequences, coupled with rather limited advantages, both of which are 
fairly well known.  The pattern increases segregation by changing the 
pattern of a white noose around a black city perhaps to be more nearly a 
white center, a black ring in inner suburbs, and a more extended white 
noose further from the center with more concentrated clusters of activity 
within this outer ring.  The pattern thus increases inequality and 
polarization within metropolitan areas.  Decentralization wastes land and 
destroys the natural environment; the arguments against sprawl are 
familiar.
  It is a pattern in which metropolitan 
areas grow as a whole, with growing clusters outside city centers and the 
decline of the centers themselves. 
21
But both the positive and negative effects of the pattern of concentrated 
decentralization pre-date 9/11, and have only been marginally accentuated 
  Decentralization has economic costs in the form of increased 
demand for transportation investment and increased claims on people’s 
time.  On the other hand, it may have some economic advantages for 
individual business firms, which may be able to put land to more cost-
efficient uses. 
 
 19. For example, Seven World Trade Center, the first major new construction in the area 
of impact of 9/11, is still seeking tenants.  See, e.g., David W. Dunlap, Rising Above Ground 
Zero, Tower Slowly Takes Shape, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2004, at B3.  Thus far, the only 
occupant is the developer himself.  Id. 
 20. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 21. See, e.g., Mark Fina & Leonard Shabman, Some Unconventional Thoughts on 
Sprawl, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 739, 739-40 (1999). 
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by it. 
C. Polarization and exclusion 
After 9/11, limitations on access to various spaces in the city increased.  
In less dense areas, there are gated communities; in cities like New York, 
the equivalents are luxury high-rises, doorman condominiums, and mega-
projects, where access is as tightly controlled.  Only those that live or have 
business in these places (and can prove it) can gain access.  The result is a 
sharp reflection of social and economic status in space; the line between 
those who are entitled to enter and those who are excluded is sharp.  
Sociologists have spoken of the abdication of the wealthy from the city;22 
many have described the segregated pattern of residence in gated 
communities;23 and the ghettos of the poor are well known.24
As with suburbanization and sprawl, the pattern of concentrated 
decentralization long antedates 9/11.  It existed before the threat of 
terrorism was in the national consciousness.  September 11, however, 
substantially hardened the pattern and probably extended its imposition. 
  The formal 
justification for the imposition of these restrictions has long been 
“security.”  But 9/11 has given a presumed legitimacy to the term 
“security” that overrides concerns about racial segregation, ethnic profiling, 
and economic discrimination—what is called above the spillover response. 
In the process, the term “security” has undergone a substantial shift in 
meaning and focus.  In its application to the travails of urban life, it used to 
refer to protection against criminal conduct like mugging, theft, burglary, 
andrape.  Today, the definition of “security” includes protection against a 
perceived threat of terrorism.  At least in the United States, the term 
“security” has always been used as a code word for protection against 
blacks and the poor, the homeless and the different, and has always 
reinforced the momentum of segregation and exclusion.  Currently, 
“security” is used even more broadly as a means of social control.25
A sign hanging in the railroad station in Bridgeport, Connecticut, reads 
  
 
 22. See, e.g., Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 20, 
1991, at 16. 
 23. E.g., SETHA LOW, BEHIND THE GATES: LIFE, SECURITY, AND THE PURSUIT OF 
HAPPINESS IN FORTRESS AMERICA 11 (2003) (noting that “[g]ated residential 
communities . . . intensify social segregation, racism, and exclusionary land use practices”). 
 24. For a classic study of the phenomenon of the ghetto, see KENNETH B. CLARK, DARK 
GHETTO: DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL POWER (1965).  The most thorough, current account is 
offered in DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION 
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 140-44, 160-62 (1993). 
 25. See Stephen Graham, Introduction, in CITIES, WAR, AND TERRORISM: TOWARDS AN 
URBAN GEOPOLITICS 1, 3-4 (Stephen Graham ed., 2004). 
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“For Security Reasons, No Loitering.”  Five years ago, such a sign would 
have seemed strange, or at most interpreted as being aimed at the homeless 
or at drunks, and enforcement would have been narrowly targeted.  Today, 
the police are routinely present at the train station, and the sign is 
interpreted as a reference to the threat of terrorism rather than to the 
harmless loitering of the homeless or drunk—again, this shift is an example 
of the spill-over response to 9/11.  Insecurity, in the deeper ontological 
sense, resulting from living in what is seen as a “risk society,”26 underlies 
both the exaggerated fear of crime and the susceptibility to the 
manipulation of the fear of terrorism.27
The false uses of the threat of security are particularly noticeable in 
immigrant communities in the cities.  The impact is particularly strong on 
those who may have questions about their legal status, perhaps because 
they have overstayed their visa or violated some other administrative law.  
But it also affects immigrants where there is no question about their legal 
status.  These immigrants, too, are questioned, stopped, and viewed warily 
by police and other officials.  In effect, the false threat of terrorism turns 
neighborhoods where immigrants are concentrated into defensive refuges 
in which their residents have a sense of security and belonging increasingly 
different from what they feel elsewhere.  “If You See Something, Say 
Something” can have a quite different impact, depending on who you are 
and where you are.  Racial and ethnic profiling may not be official policy, 
but its reality is everywhere for those of color or who have different 
religions or beliefs or habits.
 
28
D. The uses of public space 
 
The impact of the threat of terrorism on public spaces in cities has been 
substantial.  Lefebvre viewed public space as representative of the physical 
nexus of a humane and urban life, as a form of lived space in which the 
right to the city could be exercised.29
 
 26. See, e.g., ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 9 (Mark Ritter 
trans., 1992). 
  At her confirmation hearing, 
 27. Peter Marcuse, Die Manipulation der Kriminalitätsangst: Anti-Terrorismus als 
Verlagerung der Unsicherheit nach dem 11. September, in KRIMINALITÄT UND 
SICHERHEITSPOLITIK: ANALYSEN AUS LONDON, PARIS, BERLIN UND NEW YORK 89, 89-102 
(Sylke Nissen ed., 2003). 
 28. See, e.g. Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects 
Only Non-War Cases, 80  N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16 n.56 (2005); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the 
Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime control After September 11, 25 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 81, 102-03 (2005). 
 29. HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 93-96 (Donald Nicholson-Smith 
trans., 1991); see also LEFEBVRE, WRITINGS ON CITIES, supra note 7, at 236-37 (discussing 
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Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice quoted the “town square test” 
definition of democracy advanced by Israeli politician Nathan Sharansky: 
“if a person cannot walk into the middle of the town square and express his 
or her views without fear of arrest, imprisonment or physical harm, then 
that person is living in a fear society, not a free society.”30  In this view, 
which harkens back to a view that sees public space, the agora, the forum, 
as central to democracy, the openness of public spaces becomes the essence 
of democracy.  It is collective action, not individual action, communicative 
action, not self-expression, which is at the core of the democratic use of 
public space.31
I use the phrase “public space” in the lived sense, not in the legal sense.  
This view implies a broader conception of public space than a formal legal 
one that looks at ownership as the defining criteria for publicness.  I mean 
public space in its social sense, space that is lived as open and 
communicative, seen and felt and treated by most as public, without regard 
to any particular form of ownership or physical arrangement. 
 
I am concerned with those spaces that traditionally might be considered 
available or suitable for public discussion of common concerns, and 
specifically for the expression of political opinions.  One might argue that 
these are spaces in which the rights to free speech and freedom of assembly 
under our Constitution are guaranteed.32
 
the role that public space plays in preserving the right to the city). 
  The complexities of formal 
 30. See, e.g., Roger Cohen, A View of Democracy’s Responsibilities, Forged in 
Totalitarianism’s Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2005, at B7. 
 31. Thomas McCarthy, Systems Theory: Complexity and Democracy, in ESSAYS ON 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS’S THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 132-33 (Axel Honneth & Hans 
Joas eds., Jeremy Gaines & Doris L. Jones trans., 1999). 
 32. One might thus conceive of six legal forms of ownership of public space.  Here I 
provide a typical example of each of the six legal forms of ownership of public space: 
• Public ownership, public function, public use (streets); 
• Public ownership, public function, administrative use (city halls); 
• Public ownership, private function, private use (space leased to commercial 
establishments); 
• Private ownership, public function, public use (airports, gated communities, zoning 
bonus private plazas, community benefit facilities); 
• Private ownership, private function, public use (cafes, places of public 
accommodations); and 
• Private ownership, private use (homes). 
In each category, there is a wide range of situations that affect the use of public space—
depending on, among other things, size, the extent of public financing, and the public 
purpose of the use.  Under public function, I would include eight uses of public spaces: 
• Organized democratic activity; 
• Political communication; 
• Symbolism; 
• Sociability/diversity; 
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definition and legal interpretation are substantial, but I want to raise the 
issues of the use of public space as these issues affect both city planning 
and the uses of public space in cities in the United States today as matters 
of policy and political concern, not as legal matters. 
The following are classic examples of the kind of public spaces to which 
I refer: the agora of Athens, as to its (limited range of) citizens; the squares 
of Rome, as that in which Mark Anthony denounced Brutus, at least in 
Shakespeare’s play33; the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires in which the 
mothers of the disappeared protested the dictatorship;34 the steps of the 
Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. where Martin Luther King, Jr., 
gave his famous “I Have a Dream” speech35; the streets of Leipzig where 
protesters marched and helped precipitate the events that ultimately led to 
the downfall of the East German regime;36 the streets of Seattle, where 
protesters raised discussions of globalization to a new level of awareness;37 
and, most recently, perhaps, the square in front of Parliament in Kiev, 
where masses of people camped to bring down a falsely elected president.38
What is the situation in regard to such spaces today, in a city like New 
York, after 9/11?  One concluding example may suffice: the use of the 
streets of New York City, Union Square, and Central Park—public spaces 
by anyone’s definition—during the recent Republican Convention.
 
39
There were approximately 400,000 protestors who wanted to 
demonstrate their objections to the Bush agenda in a public place where 
 
 
• Recreation; 
• Environmental protection; 
• Promotion of efficient urban uses; and 
• Promotion of efficient economic uses. 
 33. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR (Washington Square Press 2004) 
(1623). 
 34. See, e.g., Daniel W. Schwartz, Rectifying Twenty-Five Years of Material Breach: 
Argentina and the Legacy of the “Dirty War” in International Law, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
317, 364 n.295 (2004). 
 35. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS 
AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 217 (James M. Washington ed., First 
Hapercollins Paperback 1991) (1986). 
 36. See, e.g., PETER MARCUSE, MISSING MARX: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL JOURNAL OF 
A YEAR IN EAST GERMANY, 1989-1990 16-17 (1991).  The peaceful ending of the East 
German Regime was, to some extent, decided when German conductor Kurt Mazur 
convinced the central authorities to treat the streets as public spaces and permit the marches. 
Id. at 66-67. 
 37. See Anupshah, W To Protests in Seattle, GLOBAL ISSUES THAT AFFECT EVERYONE, at 
http://www.globalissues.org/Traderelated/Seattle.asp (Feb. 18, 2001). 
 38. See Kiev Crowds Circle President’s HQ, BBC NEWS, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4036867.stm (Nov. 24, 2004). 
 39. I was a participant in the events described below. 
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they could be widely heard, and particularly by those attending the 
Republican convention.  After long negotiations, the organizers of the 
protest and city officials finally agreed on a march-route up Seventh 
Avenue, and a permit was secured.  The organizers hoped to end the march 
with a rally at the Great Meadow in Central Park, where hundreds of 
thousands had gathered on previous occasions for everything from rock 
concerts to anti-war protests.  But the City said no, asserting that such a 
rally would endanger the grass on the Meadow.40  Court appeals failed.41
And what of the march?  It did indeed go up Seventh Avenue, from 
Fourteenth Street to Thirty-Fourth Street, then turned towards Union 
Square where it ended.  Police barricades lined the entire march route.  
Entry and exit onto Seventh Avenue were blocked except below Fourteenth 
Street.  One could neither join nor leave the march except at locations 
where police permitted it.  Surveillance was intense and hi-tech, and the 
police were everywhere.  Signs or banners on wooden sticks were 
prohibited, but cardboard tubes attached to signs were permitted.  The 
police asked marchers not to bring backpacks and told them that all bags 
would be subject to inspection at the discretion of the police.  At the formal 
end of the march, the police told marchers to keep moving; no 
demonstration was permitted.  These limitations, justified in the name of 
avoiding the threat of terrorism and violence (which, in my opinion, was 
more a pretext than a spillover response), were visible everywhere.  The 
marchers were peaceful; there were only a handful of arrests, and those 
were only on minor charges.  Many participants later found their way to the 
Great Meadow and peacefully picnicked or broke into song.  The police 
watched but did not interfere.  For the Mayor, this was a successfully 
handled protest, often cited in the City’s bid for the 2012 Olympics as 
evidence that it could provide effective security against any threat of 
terrorism. 
  
Ultimately, there was no rally. 
How did it feel to participate?  The answer only came into focus after a 
few days had passed.  As the march proceeded up Seventh Avenue, 
protesters claimed their right to the city, chanting “Whose Streets?  Our 
Streets!  Whose Streets?  Our Streets!”  This was democracy in action.  It 
felt good, at the time. 
But was it really democracy in action?  Reflecting on the march, I 
realized that restrictions on the march demonstrated precisely that the 
 
 40. See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, A Protest in the Park? Showdown is Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 28, 2004, at B4. 
 41. See, e.g., Sunday in the Park, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at A20.  Perhaps the 
appeals came too late – the city strung out the negotiations before a lawsuit was filed.  Id. 
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streets were not “our” streets; that no “right to the city” had been exercised.  
The Mayor and the police dictated where assembly could take place; how 
and when and where and by whom the streets could be used; and whether 
the public parks could be used for the collective expression of political 
opinion.  Whose streets?  City officials’ complete domination over the use 
of public space in New York City clarified that these were their streets, not 
“our” streets, and that nothing could be done about it.  Polls showed a 
substantial majority of New Yorkers favored allowing a rally on the Great 
Meadow but that did not matter.  The officials’ actions conveyed that parks 
are for harmless picnics, not protests. 
Yet a democratic use of public spaces requires the ability to organize in 
advance, to procure loudspeakers, to erect a platform, and to permit 
collective communication among large numbers of people.  There needs to 
be a balance between the use of a city’s parks for recreation and streets for 
traffic, and their use for democratic collective purposes.  That balance, 
however, was tipped far in the private direction, for the benefit of the 
attendees at the well-organized indoor Republican Convention; it did not 
favor those protesting that convention outside. 
The issues around the use of public space for public purposes, and the 
appropriate response to the threat of terrorism in regulating their use, are 
not confined to New York City or the United States.  Around the Reichstag 
in Berlin is a “Bannmeile,” an officially sign-posted mile of space in which 
demonstrations are prohibited.42  The grounds are clearly public, and the 
restriction is enforced supposedly only when parliament is in session.  But 
in reality, the police determine whether or not the restriction is enforced.  
Similarly, in Washington, D.C., arrangements for demonstrations and 
marches and assemblies are subject to ever increasing restrictions of time, 
place, and manner.  Of course legitimate concerns demand a balance 
between rights of use and protection against terrorism.  But, as New York 
City’s response to the Republican National Convention demonstrated, the 
line between legitimate balancing on the one side and, on the other side, 
false use of the threat of terrorism to limit the impact of actions unfavorable 
to the administration is increasingly suspect.  A panel of the American 
Planning Association recently conceded that “[t]he fear of terrorism and the 
rush to protect against it has made the democracy of public space a 
victim.”43
 
 42. See, e.g., Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, Bannmeile, at http://www.parlament-
berlin.de/archiv.nsf/aAlles/D73BD5A14D18137EC1256A550033ABBD/$File/Bannmeile.p
df (last visited Oct. 26, 2005) (noting that the Bannmeile is a demonstration-free zone). 
  Good planners are doing what they can to make the restrictions 
on public space as inconspicuous and innocuous as possible.  Planners, 
 43. See Karen Finucan, Security That Works – Beautifully, PLANNING, Mar. 2005, at 4. 
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however, are told they must adhere to the guidelines provided by city 
officials.  Those guidelines, if they come from the authorities in charge of 
security, are never open for discussion.  Thus, the security authorities have 
unilateral authority to determine the balance of uses and rights. 
III. THE RIGHT TO THE CITY AFTER  9/11 
Lefebvre popularized the phrase “Right to the City” in the heady days of 
the late Sixties, when social movements were springing up all over the 
place, very visibly in Paris, claiming rights to use the city, live in the city, 
work in the city, agitate in the city, in peace.  It was a radical, indeed 
revolutionary, phrase: people had the right to determine their own 
environment and living conditions, and neither government nor any other 
powers had the right to tell them what they could or could not do in the 
exercise of democracy.  I interpret the Right to the City as a right to an 
urbane, a full, a rich, and a diverse life, and, while the right to the use of 
public space is perhaps a small part of that right to the city, it is a key 
component. 
City planning is concerned with the physical space of cities.  City 
planners believe that public spaces should be adequate, open, usable, and 
accessible to all.  We see public spaces in a sense as the symbols of a 
democratic and open city.  New York City has some great public spaces, 
including Central Park, Union Square, and much of the waterfront.  The 
debate over the protests surrounding the Republican National Convention 
demonstrates that the presence of physically adequate public space is not 
enough to achieve that openness—that democracy—that urban planners 
want to see in cities.  The management and control of space in the city, as 
well as its physical aspects, are at stake.  New York has become a city of 
control; the powers that be, in the first instance the political authorities, 
rather than the people, determine how the city and its public spaces are 
used.  In the controlled city, rights can best be exercised at home, in 
private, not in public. 
And these limitations on public use are all legitimated in the name of 
“security.”  The term “security” has become a catch-all to be defined at the 
discretion of the police and the professionals in homeland security.  Was 
anyone really at risk from terrorism in New York City while the 
Republican convention was there?  Certainly the protestors were not at risk; 
security measures were aimed at preventing them from endangering others.  
Were the conventioneers at risk?  Hardly, given that the event was held 
within the fortress created around Madison Square Garden, where access 
was tightly controlled and police, dogs, metal detectors, and helicopters 
were on hand.  Was the danger from a few anarchists?  No—none of the 
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marchers there were violent.  But the word “security” has been cut off from 
its moorings in reality, and instead has become a mantra that mere citizens 
don’t even think about questioning.  In the controlled city, use is by permit, 
not by right.  So much for public space. 
But the Right to the City has been under siege since before 9/11, and the 
false use of the threat of terrorism is only an accentuation of previously 
existing trends.  The use of public authority to control the use of space in 
the city at the expense of its residents, the use of power to override the 
desires and needs of those with less power, has a long history.  Robert 
Moses ran rough-shod over citizen opposition with his highway projects.44  
Urban renewal displaced thousands against their will.45
In broader terms, the situation is even worse.  City officials want more 
than just control of particular streets or parks on particular days, they also 
want to control major changes in the city’s form and structure, with only 
the most limited participation by the voters.  The two most recent examples 
are the rebuilding of lower Manhattan and the preparations for the 2012 
Olympics.  The City is using billions of dollars allocated to it by the federal 
government to deal with the consequences of 9/11 to subsidize real estate 
in lower Manhattan and to build a “one-seat ride” direct rail link to lower 
Manhattan from JFK airport.  But these funds would be better directed 
towards affordable housing, new schools, subway improvements, and job 
expansion.  The majority of the city lives outside of Manhattan in the outer 
boroughs; these areas have significant development needs.  If the matter 
were put to a vote, the money might be differently spent.  But the issue is 
not put to a vote.  Most recently, the state has moved jobs from state offices 
  Private urban 
renewal, gentrification, is supported by the city’s leadership despite its 
adverse impact on residents.  Mega-projects, giant developments 
internalizing many aspects of city life (security, shopping, recreation 
facilities), are supported by the city as sources of tax revenue, regardless of 
the impact such projects have on the surrounding communities and the 
people they displace.  The city uses taxes to subsidize global financial firms 
that will make the city “competitive,” although such actions may help only 
a minority of the city’s residents. 
 
 44. E.g., Rachel D. Godsil, Viewing the Cathedral From Behind the Color Line: 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Environmental Racism, 53 EMORY L.J. 1807, 1847 
(2004); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self-
Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace, 6 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 479 (1997). 
 45. A classic description of the displacement caused by Moses’s projects in New York 
City is ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 
777 (describing the condemnation of whole sections of the cities and the eviction of the 
residents of those areas) and passim (1974). 
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in Jamaica, Queens, where the residents had fought hard for investment, to 
lower Manhattan.  These decisions are not made by the people of the city. 
Indeed, the right to the city has long been in retreat.  The medieval legal 
concept of “Stadt Luft macht freie”—city air produces freedom—is long 
gone.46  Even in Germany, with all its sensitivity to restrictions on 
democracy, there are formal boundaries to the areas where demonstrations 
are permitted near the Reichstag,47 and “dangerous places” are established 
by laws where normal restrictions on police stops are suspended.48
In summary, key examples of the way the false threat of terrorism has 
been used to restrict rights to the city would include the following: 
restrictions on the everyday use of public space; restrictions on access to 
public buildings; restrictions on political expression and assembly for 
political purposes; restrictions on the freedom of immigrants to use public 
facilities and services in the city; increased segregation, exclusion, and 
concentrated decentralization of residences and economic activities and; 
restrictions on privacy and freedom from surveillance. 
  The 
manipulation of the false threat of terrorism, the most recent manifestation 
of which has been the events surrounding the Republican Convention 
protests, are perhaps only the most striking and the most directly political 
signs of the retreat from the right to the city.  The cordoning off of large 
sections of central Washington, D.C. for the inauguration is another sign of 
this retreat.  Even without massive arrests, the precautions taken in the 
name of security devalue the right to use public space in the city. 
The Right to the City has never been fully recognized in modern times.  
The false response to the threat of terrorism has made its realization even 
more remote. 
 
 
 46. Marcuse, supra note 6, at 602. 
 47. See Robert Leigcht, Die Feinde der Freiheit, DIE ZEIT, Feb. 3, 2005, at 5, available 
at http://www.zeit.de (last visited July 15, 2005). 
 48. See Volker Eick, Städtische Politik zwischen Bürgergesellschaft und Polizeistaat, 
453 AK - ANALYSE & KRITIK: ZEITUNG FUR LINKE DEBATTE UND PRAXIS 20 (Aug. 30, 2001) 
(citing paragraph twenty-one of the General Security and Order Law) (on file with author). 
